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INTRODUCTION
Orthodox Jews have a religious prohibition in which they are unable to carry items on the
Sabbath on public property. They are only able to do so in their homes or closed off curtilages of
their private property. An eruv, however, allows people to carry items, walk with their home
keys in their pockets and push baby strollers on public property on the Sabbath.1 An eruv is a
wired string that is a symbolic enclosure that combines all spaces as one space, and therefore
extends the laws of private domain into the public.2 The term eruv means mixture, which mixes
the public and private areas for purposes of access to carrying items. As a result, living in areas
in which an eruv exists is a major benefit to Orthodox Jews, as simple tasks, such as walking to
Synagogue on the Sabbath, becomes much easier.3 Additionally, Orthodox Jews prefer to live in
areas in which an eruv is already in existence, or in a place where an eruv could be constructed.
According to Orthodox Jewish law, sizes of towns, villages, and cities matter, as an eruv cannot
be placed where there is an area or road that has more than 600,000 people traveling in a street
per day.4 Most areas do not have this concern, but this is why picking certain areas to live in may
entail more than just the price of real estate.
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3 SHLOMO GANZFRIED, KITZUR SHULCHAN ARUCH 331 (Eliyahu Meir Klugman & Yosaif Asher Weiss eds. &
trans., Mesorah Publ’ns 2009) (1864).
2
Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, Installations of Jewish Law in Public Urban Space: An American Eruv Controversy,
90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 74 (2015) (detailing the history of the eruv, the controversy behind the opposition of
having one, especially in the Hamptons, and the arguments made in favor of allowing an eruv).
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Orthodox Jews are always able to walk on public property on the Sabbath without an eruv, as long as they are not
carrying items. This includes walking to Synagogue. The circumstances are much more difficult in those cases
without an eruv, but it is permissible.
4
RASHI on TALMUD BAVLI, ERUVIN 59a–b (Hersh Goldwurm, ed., Yisroel Reisman & Michoel Weiner trans.,
Mesorah Publ’ns 2006) (n.d.).
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While the eruv is very thin, and frankly very hard to see unless you are looking for it, it
has caused some issues in different communities. Being that the eruv is placed on public
property, people who oppose this believe it is a religious symbol that is being unconstitutionally
endorsed, or like other religious signs, should not be on public roads.5 Furthermore, many people
believe that if they allow an eruv to be constructed, more Orthodox Jews will move into the area,
and thus will “change” the community.
While people in certain communities may try to make an Establishment Clause claim, I
argue that denying and removing an eruv is a free exercise violation. The Establishment Clause
argument only obscures the real issue: the denial of the eruv as a way of excluding Orthodox
Jews from an area. In Section I, I will discuss the Free Exercise Clause. Section II will present
the Establishment Clause. Following that, Section III will address the lower court’s rulings.
Section IV will be the analysis under the framework of both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. Finally, Section V will be the conclusion.

I. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
In certain areas, Orthodox Jews are barred from creating an eruv using the same
resources other local residents are able to use. In Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,
the Orthodox Jews wanted to create an eruv by attaching them to the utility poles.6 The local
government did not allow this, citing that it had a sign ordinance, which prevented people from
using the utility poles.7 However, other residents of the town had used the poles, and the sign
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Fonrobert, supra note 2, at 64.
309 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Id. at 154.
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ordinance was never enforced against those residents.8 This government action amounts to
discrimination, as it burdens the Orthodox community by targeting it.
A. Discriminatory Denial of an Eruv
1. Target/suppress Orthodox Jewish communities
There have been numerous cases where religious groups have been discriminated against,
primarily by being targeted and unfairly burdened, as they were unable to perform their religious
duties. The Supreme Court has typically ruled that a law which is not neutral nor generally
applicable, and substantially burdens a religious group, violates the free exercise of religion. In
the case of Fowler v. State of R.I., there was a city ordinance that did not allow religious or
political meetings in any public park.9 Fowler, a Jehovah’s Witness minister, gave a talk in the
park, titled “The Pathway to Peace”.10 Fowler was arrested and fined under the city ordinance.11
However, the Assistant Attorney General admitted that this ordinance did not prevent church
services in the park, and that Catholics could hold mass in the parks without violating this
ordinance.12 This admission showcased how Jehovah's Witnesses’ services were treated
differently than those of other religious sects.13 The Supreme Court held that the city ordinance
targeted Fowler, since it was only cited out of dislike and discrimination for a religious group,
and it was a free exercise violation.14
The most important case regarding religious discrimination is Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.15 There were plans to build a church and other religious
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Id. at 151.
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508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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institutions in Hialeah.16 Residents of the city voiced very hostile opinions about a Santeria
church, and the religion as a whole.17 As a result, the city created ordinances that prohibited
religious animal sacrifices, and animals used for sacrificial purposes.18 Exceptions to the
ordinances were made, but these exceptions made the prohibition under the ordinances apply
almost exclusively to the church.19 This would make it impossible for the church and religious
members to practice their religion in Hialeah. There would be no possibility to both live in
Hialeah and follow their religion. Being that the ordinances and exceptions discriminated against
the church, strict scrutiny is applied. The ordinances failed strict scrutiny as they are not
narrowly tailored and do not have general applicability.20 The Court held that the city ordinance
which prohibited the religious animal sacrifices violated their free exercise.21 The ordinance by
the city specifically targeted their religion.22 Similarly, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a cake shop owner and devout Christian refused to make a
cake for a same-sex wedding.23 His refusal stemmed from his religious beliefs which opposed
same-sex marriage.24 The Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which the couple filed a charge
with, concluded that this refusal violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act by
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation .25 However, the Court ruled that the
Commission did not act in a neutral manner toward the cake shop owner, and their hostility for
religion was a violation of his free exercise.26
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Id. at 525–26.
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Like Lukumi, other cases were concerned with religious groups being able to practice
their faith where they chose. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the state law required children to attend
school until the age of 16.27 Amish children though are taken out of school after the eighth
grade.28 The government did not realize that this effect will cause forced migration, since Amish
communities would no longer be able to live in Wisconsin.29 They would be unable to live and
practice their religion in the same place.30 “[A] very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be
assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant
region.”31 The Amish were given an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause to prevent this
situation from happening.
All these cases have similarities to the eruv. Similar to Fowler, Orthodox Jews are
targeted, and therefore the denial of an eruv is a free exercise violation. As seen from Lukumi, if
the city ordinance were upheld, the members of the church would have to move and find a new
place to live. Likewise, members of the Orthodox Jewish communities would have much more
difficulty living in places where an eruv is prohibited, and would therefore have to move to a
different location. As a result, this is in violation of Lukumi. Parallel to Masterpiece Cakeshop, a
city ordinance that disallows an eruv is not done in a neutral manner, as it shows hostility
towards Orthodox Jews’ religious ways. Especially the size and placement of an eruv, which is
hardly seen, showcases that people who oppose it, do not oppose the string on a utility pole, but
the Orthodox Jews who use it. Comparable to Yoder, Orthodox Jews would likely have a forced
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migration from places if an eruv was not allowed. Orthodox Jews can still practice their religion
even if there is no eruv, however, the burden would be substantial and people would likely move
away. From all these cases, any city ordinance that prohibits the installation of an eruv violates
the Free Exercise Clause.

2. Exclusions of Orthodox Jewish Communities from General Benefit Programs
The Supreme Court has also found discrimination in situations where religious groups are
excluded from a general benefit program. For instance, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, the grant program that prevented the church from receiving the benefit, was a free
exercise violation, because it discriminated against the religious organization based on religion.32
Grants were given to schools and daycare centers to refurbish their playgrounds.33 These grants
had come from public funds.34 However, not everyone qualified to receive the grant money to
resurface their playgrounds. “The department had a strict and express policy of denying grants to
any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.”35 The Court ruled
that disqualifying a group because it was a religious institution, regardless that it did not do this
based on a specific religion, but the mere fact that it was a religious group, is expressly
discriminatory.36
In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the “no-aid” provision in Montana’s
Constitution said that the state program, which helps with tuition assistance for parents that send
their children to private schools, could not use this money for a religious school.37 The Court
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137 S. Ct. 2012, 2015 (2017).
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140 S. Ct. 2246, 2249 (2020).
33

7

held that Montana’s “no-aid” provision discriminated against religious schools and the families
who enrolled in religious schools.38 Building upon Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that this
exclusion based on religious status was a free exercise violation.39
With the eruv, allowing anyone to use utility poles for signs, advertisements, and other
items, but prohibiting Orthodox Jews from attaching a string for a religious purpose, is
discriminating based on religion. This religious discrimination is similar to Trinity Lutheran.
Additionally, the Orthodox Jewish community is similar to the families in Espinoza who send
their children to religious schools, as they cannot enjoy a benefit that is afforded to all, simply on
the basis of religion. Like Espinoza, the opponents of the eruv violate the Free Exercise Clause.

B. Heightened Protections for the Hybrid of Religion and Association
The eruv is not just a small function of Orthodox Jewish life, but an essential need. It is
critical in ensuring community life and associational freedoms. Without it, families with young
children cannot take part in gatherings, as there is no way they could leave their homes as a
family without having to carry items (i.e., baby strollers). This also applies to adults in
wheelchairs and walkers, as they too would be considered carrying items in the public domain.
Therefore, this forces individuals to remain locked indoors for the entirety of the Sabbath.
Furthermore, the adults that can only travel with a wheelchair or walker cannot even attend
Synagogue on the Sabbath, a fundamental aspect of their religion. This causes the Orthodox
community to suffer a substantial burden. In the case of Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, it was established that neutral laws of general applicability are subject only
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Id.
Id.
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to rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, regardless of the burden on religion.40 However,
one of the exceptions to this is when the burden affects not only religion but another
constitutional right, like association.41 This creates the hybrid situation. Smith makes clear that
such hybrid situations invoke strict scrutiny.
Given the critical role the eruv plays in allowing community life and the freedom of
association, prohibitions on the eruv will be subject to strict scrutiny review by a court. The
prohibition of an eruv substantially burdens the Orthodox Jewish community. Furthermore, there
is no compelling government interest, as installing an eruv does not establish a religion. Lastly,
banning an eruv, which creates severe obstacles for Orthodox Jews from partaking in essential
religious functions, is not the least restrictive means by the government. All these reasons show
the government cannot justify the substantial burden they create. Therefore, this violates the Free
Exercise Clause.

II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Even if a local town allows for an eruv to be constructed, there are times where residents
who oppose an eruv sue the town, claiming the eruv violates the Establishment Clause. In
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. City of Long Branch, the ACLU argued that the
creation of an eruv violated the Establishment Clause.42 The court used the Lemon Test, and
determined that allowing an eruv does not violate the Establishment Clause.43
A. Eruv: Not a “Religious Symbol” under Case Law
1. Religious symbols placed on public property to send a message.
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 882.
42
670 F. Supp. 1293,1294 (D.N.J. 1987).
43
Id. at 1297.
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The Supreme Court announced the Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
which set out three requirements as to whether the Establishment Clause was violated: 1) there
must be a secular purpose, 2) it may not advance any religion, and 3) it cannot result in excessive
government entanglement with religion.44 This is known as the Lemon Test. Justice O’Connor
modified the Lemon Test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly by creating the
Endorsement Test.45 Under this test, the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon Test (prongs
one and two) are seen from an endorsement perspective.46 With the purpose prong, “it is whether
the government intends to convey a messages of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”47 For
the effect prong, it is whether the government “has the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”48 Both of these tests have been used by the
Court. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, a menorah was put on display outside a courthouse,
alongside a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.49 The menorah in the display was held
constitutional because its religious meaning was put in a larger context of holidays and religious
diversity.50 Under the endorsement test, it was determined that a reasonable observer would not
look at the menorah and think that the government was endorsing Judaism, but rather that the
government was recognizing holidays and religious liberty.51
The Court has applied these tests where religious symbols on public property have been
challenged. In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the county put
up a frame of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse.52 After the ACLU filed suit citing a

44

403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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violation of the Establishment Clause, the county twice added additional historical non-religious
documents, surrounding the Ten Commandments.53 The Court said that the government violated
the Establishment Clause, as these framed displays had a religious purpose, and it had favored a
religious purpose over a secular purpose.54 That same year in Van Orden v. Perry, a monolith
with the Ten Commandments was placed on the Texas State Capitol grounds.55 There was a
challenge that this violated the Establishment Clause.56 However, the Court ruled that the display
of the religiously-themed monolith on the capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment
Clause.57 This case differed from McCreary, as the group who donated the monolith did have
religious ties, but was more concerned with guiding morality and stopping “juvenile
delinquency”.58 Additionally, the placement of the monolith showed nothing sacred about it.59
On the other hand, the county in McCreary had deep religious objectives, and the placement of
the frame in the courthouse was a governmental effort to promote religion.60 The Court also
mentioned the placement of the monument in Van Orden was not very noticeable, especially
compared to other cases.61 Additionally, it was also important that the monument was one of 17
monuments and 21 historical markers on the grounds of the state capital and no one had noticed
or been concerned about it until one person complained.62 Therefore, the Court allowed the
religious symbol on public property.63
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Id. at 852–53
Id. at 862–63, 881.
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Id. at 682.
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Courts have also found that sectarian symbols like a cross on public property can be
constitutional. Fourteen years later, in the case of American Legion v. American Humanist
Assoc., a claim was brought that a cross on public land, which was erected as a monument 89
years prior, violated the Establishment Clause.64 The Court, however, disagreed.65 While it is a
cross, which is a religious symbol, in this instance it took on a secular meaning, as its point was
to commemorate those lost in World War I.66 “[W]hen time’s passage imbues a religiously
expressive monument, symbol, or practice with this kind of familiarity and historical
significance, removing it may no longer appear neutral, especially to the local community for
which it has taken on particular meaning.”67 The Court went further into speaking about its
historical significance, and its symbolic stature. Therefore, it did not violate the Establishment
Clause. In agreement with the Court’s position on religious symbols, in American Atheists, Inc.
v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the organization brought an Establishment Clause
claim against the Port Authority and the National September 11 Memorial and Museum
Foundation, when they included a steel cross from the debris of the World Trade Center.68 The
steel cross was erected by volunteers a few weeks after the attack on September 11, 2001.69 The
Port Authority retrieved the steel cross for the museum.70 American Atheists claimed that this
steel cross violated the Establishment Clause, as there was no “accompanying atheist recognition
plaque”.71 The court held that this did not violate the Establishment Clause, as the display of the
cross was actually a secular purpose.72 The cross was not an endorsement of religion, and its
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139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
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Id.
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760 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 234.
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purpose was to remember the history of the terrorist attacks.73 While a cross is generally a
religious symbol, this steel cross is a symbol of hope and healing.74 Therefore, the Establishment
Clause claim was denied, and affirmed by this court.
The Court has moved away from both the Lemon Test and Endorsement Test,75 especially
in their opinions in Van Orden and American Legion. In these two cases, the majority opinion
noted that the Lemon Test was used on an inconsistent basis, and therefore, there was no reason
to use the test.76 Additionally, in American Legion, it was noted that since the memorials were
erected so long ago, there was no way to know the original purpose of it, and therefore, the
Lemon Test should be avoided.77
All four of these cases were about religious symbols that were donated by people to the
town. They were all intended to send a message; the message of holiday celebration, of
reverence for religious text, of community ethics, and of honoring those who had died. The eruv,
however, is different from these cases. While the eruv is a religious symbol, it is not a
discernable symbol, it is not intended to send a message and it is not intended for all to see with
ease. When looking at an eruv, most people who are unfamiliar with the concept would not make
a correlation as to what it is. It is a thin string that is on a utility pole. The string used is the same
string that any person can purchase for their own personal use. Furthermore, it is not erected for
any symbolic purpose. Its purpose is to create a boundary for Orthodox Jews to be allowed to
carry items in public. This does not send any messages to the public at large, as it only allows
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Orthodox Jews to walk freely as all others are able to do. As to the placement of the eruv, it is
not intended for people to see (with ease, at least). It is placed high up on utility poles, and once
a week an inspector goes up and checks the eruv to make sure there is no damage to it. Members
of the Orthodox community assume the eruv is up, unless otherwise notified that there has been
significant damage to the eruv. It is not placed in a position for all people on a highway to see.
Being that it is so thin in nature, and the placement is very high up, people generally will not
notice it, unless they are actively looking for it. That is why these cases do have some similarities
to the eruv, but they are completely different in most ways.

B. Even if a religious symbol, no Establishment Clause Violation
If an eruv happens to be considered a religious symbol on public property, it is not a
concern, as it meets the Lemon Test by satisfying the three prongs, and it meets the Endorsement
Test. Erecting an eruv has a secular purpose to enable people to walk outside their property in
order to associate with others. It does not advance any religion and there is no excessive
government entanglement. Furthermore, erecting an eruv does not convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion from the government. Additionally, as seen from both
Van Orden and American Legion, a religious symbol, such as the eruv, can still have secular
and/or civic meaning. All it does is allow Orthodox Jews living in a certain geographic area the
ability to move freely in the public domain on the Sabbath, while carrying an item or pushing a
stroller/wheelchair.
1. Proper Accommodations
While the concern of the Establishment Clause is the endorsement or sponsorship of a
religion, there is an acceptable measure that allows an “accommodation” to a religious group or
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institution in certain instances. In fact, there are currently over 2,000 exceptions; some are just
based on religion, while others are religion and more.78 Most accommodations do not violate the
Establishment Clause. In the case of Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, defendant Mayson was fired by a religious organization for
a non-religious job position on the basis of his religion.79 Mayson claimed that the Title VII
exemption, which allowed the religious employer to fire him, violated the Establishment
Clause.80 The Court ruled that the exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause.81 The
accommodation allows religious organizations to hire people of their own faith.82 It had a secular
legislative purpose, and did not advance a religion, nor did it create church-state entanglement.
In Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, it was ruled that a property tax
exemption, in which the property was used only for a religious purpose, did not violate the
Establishment Clause.83 In the Court’s reasoning, they said the purpose of the tax exemption is
not to advance or hinder a religion, nor sponsor or show hostility towards it.84 Also, it has not
singled out one religion, but has granted all exemptions to all religions and to other non-profits if
they met certain criteria.85 The legislative purpose behind the exemption was not to establish,
sponsor or support a religion.86
As seen from these two cases, an accommodation to a religion is not in fact an
establishment of a religion. The Title VII exemption in Amos showcased that religious groups are
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James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV.
1407, 1445 (1992)
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483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
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Id. at 331.
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Id. at 339.
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Id. at 337.
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allowed to practice their religion by hiring people who have the same belief and agree with its
mission. This shows that the accommodation must be tied to promoting free exercise.
Furthermore, Walz is in part about promoting diversity of groups in society. Allowing Orthodox
Jews to erect an eruv accomplishes both the promotion of free exercise, and the ability to have
more diverse groups in a community.
Accommodations that allow the religious person unlimited discretion are more likely to
violate the Establishment Clause. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., an employee refused to
work on Sundays, as it was the day he observed his Sabbath.87 The state law allowed employees
to designate their Sabbath day, on which they would never work, without any regard to the
employer, business needs, union contracts, or other employees.88 As a result of his refusal, he
was demoted to a lower store position.89 He claimed his demotion was in violation of a state law
that barred employers for mandating employees to work on their Sabbath.90 The Court ruled that
such a state law violated the Establishment Clause, as it gave a major preference to members of a
religion over an employer, which was unlimited and at the discretion of the religious
individual.91 However, Thornton is very different than the issue of the eruv, as Thornton set the
outer boundary of the doctrine, and the eruv accommodations are well within the boundary.
Therefore, by allowing Orthodox Jewish to erect an eruv, this is just an accommodation, not an
establishment.

2. No Proselytization, No Exclusivity
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The case law allows very explicitly that religious items be placed permanently on public
property as long as it is inclusive and nondiscriminatory, and does not proselytize. The eruv
meets those requirements.
As seen in American Legion, the military used crosses as a symbolic honor.92 It did not
discriminate against anyone, and anyone who was buried in that cemetery was honored with a
cross or a Star of David.93 Similarly, in Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, the Court found a
prayer rotation at town council meetings not to be discriminatory.94 The monthly board meetings
held in the town would always begin with a prayer.95 There were all various types of clergymen
of different religions that would conduct the prayer.96 Even a person of no faith was able to lead
the prayer.97 From 1999 to 2007, the monthly board meetings were all opened by Christian
ministers.98 A claim was brought claiming this violated the Establishment Clause, saying that
Christian prayers were favored over any other kinds of religious and nonsectarian groups.99 The
Court held that this did not violate the Establishment Clause, as this practice of legislative prayer
had existed since the drafting of the Constitution.100 “[L]egislative prayer lends gravity to public
business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and
expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”101 Furthermore, “the Court has
considered this symbolic expression to be a ‘tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely
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held’ rather than a first, treacherous step towards establishment of a state church.”102 As long as
the prayer was not an attempt to convert anyone’s religion or beliefs, it was constitutional.
Since the eruv is open and nondiscriminatory, as anyone who chooses can partake in it,
and it does not try to proselytize anyone, it does not violate the Establishment Clause. Therefore,
it should be allowed to be permanently placed on public property, as the case law dictates.

III. LOWER COURTS
There are two cases highlighted in which the Orthodox Jewish residents wanted to install
an eruv in their community, but the local governments did not allow it, so the Orthodox residents
brought a claim that this was a free exercise violation. In Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of
Tenafly, the Orthodox Jews of Tenafly, New Jersey, wanted to put up an eruv in their
community.103 They planned to put the eruv wires attaching them to the utility poles.104 They
wanted to attach “lechis”, which are “thin black strips made of the same hard plastic material as,
and nearly identical to, the coverings on ordinary ground wires—vertically along utility
poles”.105 There was a local rule, Ordinance 691, which said as follows: “No person shall place
any sign or advertisement, or other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or elsewhere,
in any public street or public place, excepting such as may be authorized by this or any other
ordinance of the Borough.”106 This applied to both secular and religious items. However, many
people had placed things on trees and public spaces, and the borough had never enforced
Ordinance 691.107 The Orthodox community attached the lechis to the phone company wires,
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which would not be in clear sight.108 When the borough found out about the lechis, they cited
Ordinance 691 (possibly for the first time in its existence) and forced the cable company to
remove the lechis.109 Tenafly residents Chaim Book, Yosifa Book, Stephanie Dardick Gottlieb
and Stephen Brenner formed the Tenafly Eruv Association.110 They sued the Borough of
Tenafly, Mayor of Tenafly Ann Moscovitz, and council members Charles Lipson, Martha Kerge,
Richard Wilson, Arthur Peck and John Sullivan.111 The Tenafly Eruv Association claimed that
the defendants violated the First Amendment (along with the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Fair Housing Act).112 They argued that the borough violated their right to Free Exercise of
Religion, and Free Expression, and they sought a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order to prevent the borough from taking away the established demarcations that had
already been built.113
The district court denied the preliminary injunction and the temporary restraining order
dissolved.114 The court stated that they did not view the borough as being discriminatory, did not
violate the free exercise rights, did not violate the FHA, and that utility poles were not public
forums for speech.115 The Eruv Association appealed this decision.116 The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgement.117 The court said there was no FHA violation, and the residents were not
able to state a claim of how creating an eruv was conduct that needed protection under the First
Amendment.118 However, the court went further and said that the borough selectively enforced
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Ordinance 691, and did so against the Orthodox Jews’ religious beliefs, and as a result violated
the Free Exercise Clause.119 The Court invoked Lukumi as it is similar to the present case
because the Tenafly Eruv Association was not asking for preferential treatment, but rather to not
have the ordinance enforced, similar to how others were exempt from it.120 As seen from Lukumi,
“government cannot discriminate between religiously motivated conduct and comparable
secularly motivated conduct in a manner that devalues religious reasons for acting.”121 It also
addressed Fowler, and addressed the similarities to the present case. This case is similar to
Fowler as the borough never enforced Ordinance 691 before, only against the Orthodox Jews,
just like the ordinance in Fowler was selectively enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses, but
exempted other religious groups.122 The Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction
from removing the lechis.123 Another case also barred an eruv in a community, but this involved
not only the Orthodox Jewish community against the local government, but it was also the
Orthodox Jewish community against the Secular Jewish community.
In the first of multiple cases, East End Eruv Association, Inc. v. Village of Westhampton
Beach, the Orthodox Jewish community in Westhampton Beach wanted to erect an eruv for the
members of the community.124 The eruv would create a boundary for Westhampton Beach, the
Village of Quogue and Southampton.125 “Westhampton Beach is an incorporated village located
in Southampton…Quogue is an incorporated village located in Southampton.”126 The East End
Eruv Association (EEEA) created a license agreement with utility companies.127 This first
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agreement was made with Long Island Power Authority (LIPA), and the second with Verizon.128
The agreements included that the lechis would be affixed to the utility poles.129 Southampton
opposed these agreements. “Southampton first learned of a potential eruv boundary within the
unincorporated areas of Southampton when they received plaintiffs' motion, months after this
action was commenced.”130 Furthermore, Southampton claimed that both agreements EEEA
made should be terminated as EEEA did not apply for licenses with the utility companies in the
proper amount of time.131 However, the utility companies disputed this, as they claimed they did
not issue licenses because Southampton stated it was not permitted.132 In the event that EEEA
can get an injunction, both utility companies are plaintiffs in a different action, claiming that the
lechis should be allowed to be affixed to the utility poles, regardless of Southampton’s
approval.133
The main reason the local government of Southampton opposed an eruv was because
they had a sign ordinance, which was to “promote the public health, safety and welfare through a
comprehensive system of reasonable, effective, consistent, content-neutral, and
nondiscriminatory sign standards and requirements.”134 They said that a lechi, which is part of an
eruv, is a sign, and therefore should fall under the requirements of the sign ordinance.135
Furthermore, they said that Orthodox Jewish people believe they can carry items in public when
an eruv is erected, and therefore this sends a message.136 The Southampton local government
claimed they actively police the utility poles, and can remove any signs at any point, and that
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they did not selectively enforce the ordinance, but enforced it to a high standard.137 In
Westhampton, they did not believe an eruv is a sign.138 However, for an eruv to be erected,
Westhampton would need to approve it.139 Finally, Quogue had strict rules about any banners,
emblems, or signs attached to utility poles.140 They also said that no permit was applied for, none
was granted, and EEEA was unable to show selective enforcement of these rules.141
The EEEA claimed that Southampton selectively enforces their sign ordinance, and that
strict scrutiny should apply.142 They produced six images of what they claimed are signs posted,
and Southampton had not removed them.143 Two of the signs were right beneath the utility wires,
lower than where the eruv would be, and Southampton had not removed them.144 With
Westhampton, EEEA said that the town opposed an eruv, so Westhampton would never approve
an application, even though they said a lechi is not a sign under their sign ordinance, and there
were no set application guidelines EEEA was supposed to obey.145 Lastly, EEEA argued that
Quogue obstructed the eruv by claiming its village code applies to lechis being attached to utility
poles, as these are encroachments.146 EEEA stated these are not encroachments under the village
code, and therefore, they do not have to apply for permits.147 Additionally, EEEA stated that
Quogue has selectively enforced these rules regarding attachments to utility poles.148
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In its decision, the District Court held that this action was not ripe against the
Southampton defendants, as EEEA did not apply for permits for the eruv, and it was unable to
show that this process was futile and incapable of producing a useful result.149 Southampton had
stated that the lechis were considered signs under the sign ordinance.150 Also, the exact location
of the boundaries for the eruv in all three locations still seemed uncertain.151 The court continued
and said that even if the action was ripe, the plaintiffs had been unable to show a strong chance
of success on the claims they made.152 Finally, the local governments had not interfered with the
agreement between the EEEA and the utility companies.153 This case was distinguished from
Tenafly, as there was no evidence that the town strategically allowed exemptions except for the
Orthodox Jews.154
Besides the local governments, the Secular Jewish members of Westhampton Beach
came out against an eruv. They created a group, which “[i]t bears emphasizing that this group
represents itself quite explicitly and strategically as Jewish”.155 They called themselves “Jewish
People Opposed to the Eruv” (JPOE), also known as “Jewish People for the Betterment of
Westhampton Beach”.156 They claimed their reason for the opposition to an eruv was that it
violated the Establishment Clause.157 They did not mention any anti-religion motives. However,
this case caught the media by storm. Jon Stewart, then host of The Daily Show on Comedy
Central, sent comedian Wyatt Cenac to interview residents and showcase it on the show.158
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Leading proponents against the eruv made it known that they viewed the Orthodox Jewish
community as very closed-minded people, and did not want to attract more Orthodox Jews into
their area, as they may “change the area”.159
JPOE filed a motion to intervene in the case between the EEEA and the villages.160 Their
motion was denied.161 They then sued the EEEA, Westhampton Beach, LIPA and Verizon,
claiming that an eruv would be a violation of the Establishment Clause.162 This too was
dismissed, as they were unable to show how the municipalities did not represent their interests in
the case.163 On appeal, in Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of
Westhampton, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision against the JPOE.164 JPOE had tried to
argue that an eruv is something that will not go unnoticed, and “will be a constant and everpresent symbol, message and reminder to the community at large, that the secular public spaces
of the Village have been transformed for religious use and identity.”165 They also said they will
have to face this religious display on a daily basis.166 The Court, however, determined that they
were unable to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause by the defendants, and
were unable to show a lack of a secular purpose, as EEEA and LIPA had entered into an
agreement with one another to attach the lechis to the utility poles.167 The Court stated, “[n]eutral
accommodation of religious practice qualifies as a secular purpose under Lemon.”168 The Court
also cited American Atheists when discussing using the Lemon Test for JPOE’s Establishment
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Clause claim.169 Furthermore, in American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. City of Long
Branch, the court stated that if there is no evidence to show that an eruv was installed in a nonneutral way, allowing an organization to attach lechis to utility poles, it serves a secular purpose
of accommodation.170 In addition, the Court said that no person would look at the eruv and
believe a religion is being endorsed.171 Lastly, there was no issue of government entanglement
with regard to religion.172

IV. ANALYSIS
As seen from the Constitutional framework, there is a balance that must be met between
satisfying the Free Exercise Clause and not violating the Establishment Clause. The eruv fits this
balance.
The Tenafly case has a strong resemblance to Lukumi as the acts of the local government
targets the Orthodox Jewish community. It also has similarities to Yoder, as the acts of the local
governments could unknowingly cause a forced migration. This type of suppression is clearly
discriminatory, and is in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. If this targeting of a religion was
not deemed unconstitutional, what would stop every city in the country from adopting similar
city ordinances, and therefore not permitting the members of a religion from living there? With
Tenafly, the same question could be asked. While it is possible to live in a place where there is
no eruv, it does make life much more difficult for the individuals, especially families with
younger children who are not able to walk far distances. People will therefore generally not
move into an area that does not have an eruv, or to a place where there is controversy
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surrounding the eruv. These kinds of state actions would not be generally applicable and facially
neutral, but instead would be discriminatory. This means they would still be subject to strict
scrutiny even under Smith. Besides for the substantial burden, there is no compelling government
interest. The sign ordinance in Tenafly was not cited when people outside of the Orthodox
community posted items considered signs. Not only was this discriminatory, it shows the sign
ordinance was not really a government interest. Additionally, having an eruv does not establish a
religion. Therefore, this clearly violates the Free Exercise Clause.
In Tenafly, the court looked at the sign ordinance, and the enforcement of it.173 While the
ordinance was neutral on its face, the selective enforcement of it was what violated the Free
Exercise Clause.174 The borough had turned a blind eye to many (if not all) instances when the
sign ordinance was violated by residents of Tenafly.175 It was when the Orthodox Jewish
Community had placed wires attached to the utility poles, allowing them the freedom to practice
their religion, the borough objected.176 This selective enforcement was a clear violation of the
Free Exercise Clause, as it excluded the Orthodox Jewish community from a general benefit
program.177 Every other resident could post things on the poles, except for the Orthodox.
Additionally, there was no Establishment Clause concern that the borough needed to be
concerned about. As a result, the eruv should remain intact.
With regard to East End Eruv Ass’n and Jewish People for the Betterment of
Westhampton Beach, the JPOE tried to claim an Establishment Clause violation.178 However, the
Court ruled that they did not state a claim, as the EEEA and Verizon were not state actors.179
173
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Therefore, there would be no establishment of a religion by a state actor.180 Additionally, the
Court cited the Long Branch opinion that every court that measured whether such acts by
government violated the Establishment Clause agreed it did not.181 “The city allowed the eruv to
be created to enable observant Jews to engage in secular activities on the Sabbath. This action
does not impose any religion on the other residents of [Long Branch].”182 This is simply a result
of it not being considered a religious symbol on public property to send a message, and even if
people do view it as a religious symbol, it still does not violate the Establishment Clause as it
would be considered an accommodation. Furthermore, since an eruv is open and
nondiscriminatory, anyone can partake in it, and it does not try to proselytize anyone, it does not
violate the Establishment Clause.
Lastly, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Justice Ginsburg in her dissent brought up
third-party harms.183 Third-party harms refer to those who are harmed when a religious
accommodation is made.184 Communities do not feel hurt when they see (or more likely search to
find) an eruv. For Orthodox Jews, this is an essential part of their religion. Orthodox Jews who
cannot practice their religion as comfortably suffer the burden under strict scrutiny, and
accommodating them by allowing an eruv does not cause some third-party harm. As seen from
Tenafly and Westhampton, the lechis are connected to utility poles and cable wires. As most
people do not stare at cable wires, most people would not even know the eruv was there, and
therefore would likely not feel harm by an eruv.
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V. CONCLUSION
While people in certain communities can make an argument that an eruv violates the
Establishment Clause because it is seen as a religious symbol, I do not believe that argument can
be founded. I believe the size of the symbol in question does in fact matter. An eruv is not easily
visible, and one must look for it to see it. Furthermore, by having an eruv up, it is not viewed as
an establishment of religion, but rather an accommodation made for the Orthodox Jewish
community. It is similar in that instance to both Lukumi and Yoder, and the alternative of forced
migration is not what the Court wants. Also, it is similar to Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza as the
Orthodox Jews should be able to enjoy a benefit that is afforded to all. Thirdly, as Justice
Ginsburg said in her dissent in Hobby Lobby, who is being hurt by this? While Westhampton
may claim they are uncomfortable by seeing an eruv, it does not really affect them, and being
uncomfortable is not anywhere near the type of harm Justice Ginsburg was talking about. When
balancing the two sides of the argument of who is injured more by having the other’s result,
whether it would be Orthodox Jews not being able to move to certain areas, or people noticing
another string connected to their cable wires, it would show the Orthodox Jewish community to
be more hurt as a result of the other’s decision. Lastly, I do think that anti-religion plays a role
here. In Tenafly, the local ordinance was never cited before the borough used it to prevent the
eruv. Similarly, in Westhampton, when people were interviewed and shown on The Daily Show,
they made it known of their negative views of Orthodox Jews. It seems that while different
communities can make an Establishment Clause argument, their true fear is the possibility of
Orthodox Jews moving into their areas. For these reasons I do not believe this is an
Establishment Clause issue, but rather a violation of the Orthodox Jews’ free exercise.
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